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AVERTING AN INSIDE JOB: A PROPOSAL TO CHANGE 
HOW INSIDERS ARE DEFINED IN THE BANKRUPTCY CODE  
ABSTRACT 
Are you a business debtor with massive unsecured debts and need your 
cramdown plan approved? Just sell the claims to a friend at a massive 
discount and have him vote to approve your plan over other creditors’ 
objections. While this sounds absurd, under current insider jurisprudence in 
chapter 11 bankruptcies, this happens. 
In most situations, the Bankruptcy Code prohibits insiders of businesses 
from seeking preferential treatment from a bankrupt debtor. One way the Code 
does this is through excluding an insider’s vote from the plan approval process 
in a chapter 11 bankruptcy cramdown. But, if an insider can find a way to 
escape the narrow statutory insider definition in the Code, then the usual 
prohibitions on insider conduct may not apply. 
In addition to the narrow, specified list of statutory insiders in the Code, 
courts have crafted various definitions of non-statutory insiders as well. This 
lack of uniform and predictable application has thwarted one of bankruptcy’s 
main goals: the equitable treatment of creditors. This Comment examines 
courts’ conflicting applications of insider rules, with a focus on chapter 11, 
and recommends a change to how insiders are defined in the Code to prevent 
inequitable outcomes for creditors. 
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I. INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER 11 AND INSIDERS 
A. A Need for a Change 
The chapter 11 bankruptcy process allows debtors to retain their assets, 
reorganize their debts, and pay off their creditors according to a plan of 
reorganization.1 Chapter 11 is utilized primarily by business debtors to 
maintain and preserve a functioning company, while modifying otherwise 
overwhelming debts, by spreading payments out over a repayment period or 
changing the terms of various debts according to a plan.2 Congress has crafted 
the Bankruptcy Code (the Code) to ensure that creditors and debtors receive 
equitable treatment and to minimize abusive use of Code provisions.3 One area 
of potential abuse that Congress addresses through the Code is the area of 
insiders. 
Insiders are persons (which the Code defines broadly as including 
individuals and entities)4 who have clear self-interest in the outcome of a 
bankruptcy proceeding, such as directors, officers, or persons in control of a 
corporate debtor.5 Because of their close affiliation and personal stake in the 
reorganization, insiders are specifically prevented, among other things, from 
voting to approve a reorganization plan if they are also creditors holding any 
voting claims.6 Under the current statutory scheme, some individuals who 
appear to be insiders, but technically do not meet the statutory criteria, are 
permitted to vote on a reorganization plan and potentially force an otherwise 
non-confirmable plan upon dissenting creditors.7 This Comment will argue that 
this practice is abusive and thwarts Congress’s intent to draft a Code that treats 
similarly situated creditors equitably.  
To address this problem, Congress should amend the Code by changing 
how the Code defines “insider.” Rather than the current inclusive list that 
allows courts to interpret whether a person fits the strict insider definition 
(thereby becoming statutory insiders), or is similar enough to be considered a 
non-statutory insider, Congress should define “insider” exclusively. This 
 
 1 See U.S. COURTS, BANKRUPTCY BASICS 3 (2d ed. 1998). 
 2 Id.  
 3 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 109 P.L. 8, 119 Stat. 23, 109 P.L. 8, 
2005 Enacted S. 256, 109 Enacted S. 256, drafted primarily to prevent abuse.  
 4 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (2012). 
 5 See id. § 101(31). 
 6 See id. § 1129(a)(10). 
 7 See U.S. Bank N.A. v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC (In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC), 814 F.3d 993, 998 
(9th Cir. 2016). 
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exclusive definition will improve predictability, prevent abusive claim selling 
by debtors, and better meet Congress’s goals for chapter 11 bankruptcy.  
This Comment proceeds by detailing the chapter 11 process, continues 
with an examination of the Code’s current definition of “insider,” and then 
explains the background and purposes of chapter 11 bankruptcy. Next, this 
Comment will set up the conflict between courts in defining non-statutory 
insiders, with some courts taking a liberal view of insiders and others taking a 
narrow view, and examine how commentators and courts alike have predicted 
future litigation and possible abuse. In the final section, this Comment will 
propose a solution that modifies how the Code defines insider so as to prevent 
these conflicting interpretations and potential abuses. This Comment will 
conclude with an explanation of the mechanics of the new definition’s 
application, an examination of the benefits and potential drawbacks of a new 
definition, and the issues that will continue to inevitably arise with insider 
determinations. 
B. The Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Process 
1. Restructuring and the Automatic Stay 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy provides for debt restructuring of businesses under 
a court confirmed plan of reorganization to repay creditors.8 While a chapter 7 
bankruptcy proceeding is also available for business debtors, a chapter 11 
bankruptcy allows a company to continue to operate during and (hopefully) 
after bankruptcy, thus avoiding asset liquidation and closing of the business.9 
In a chapter 7, there is no chance of saving the business because all of the 
debtor company’s assets are liquidated to satisfy its debts.10 Under a chapter 
11, the debtor maintains the business and its assets and “may seek an 
adjustment of debts, either by reducing the debt or by extending the time for 
repayment, or may seek a more comprehensive reorganization.11“ Even if a 
debtor is not able to emerge successfully from a chapter 11 bankruptcy, the 
debtor is nonetheless protected by the automatic stay12 from the time the debtor 
 
 8 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2012). 
 9 See BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 1, at 3.  
 10 See id. at 11. 
 11 Id. 
 12 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). Other than an ultimate discharge, the automatic stay is the greatest 
protection provided by bankruptcy and a major objective in and of itself for debtors. The automatic stay 
prevents creditors from taking many actions, including attempting to collect debts from the debtor, 
repossessing property from a debtor, and enforcing liens against any of the creditor’s property.  
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files the petition until discharge, dismissal, or conversion to chapter 7.13 This at 
least gives the debtor a significant amount of time14 to try to save the business 
by providing a “breathing spell . . . during which negotiations can take place to 
try to resolve the difficulties in the debtor’s financial situation.”15 Ultimately, if 
a business is insolvent, but management is determined to continue operating in 
order to eventually salvage the company, chapter 11 is likely the proper choice.  
2. Classifying Claims, Impairment, and Voting  
The chapter 11 process involves preparing a reorganization plan, 
identifying creditor claims, determining if claims are impaired, and claim 
voting to approve or disapprove the plan. To begin a chapter 11 bankruptcy, a 
business files a petition with the bankruptcy court where the business is 
domiciled.16 A chapter 11 debtor, known as a debtor in possession,17 must file 
a number of additional documents and schedules that give creditors and the 
courts an understanding of the business’s financial situation.18 One critical 
document that the debtor in possession must file is a plan of reorganization, 
which specifically proposes how the debtor intends to modify its debts based 
on the type of each creditor’s claims.19 The debtor’s plan must assemble each 
creditor’s claim, defined broadly in the Code as a “right to payment,20“ into a 
class.21 Each claim represents a creditor’s right to vote in the ultimate 
acceptance or rejection of a plan,22 so each creditor may have a number of 
claims based on distinct rights to payment. 
 
 13 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(c)(2)(A)–(C) (2012). 
 14 See id. § 1121. From the time a debtor files a chapter 11 petition they have an exclusive 120-day 
period to file a plan of reorganization, which under certain circumstances may be extended by a court to up to 
18 months.  
 15 BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 1, at 27. 
 16 Id. at 2. 
 17 Id. at 25.; 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2012). A “debtor in possession” under chapter 11 is the term used to 
describe the debtor who is performing the requirements of bankruptcy while also retaining possession of 
property of the estate and other assets. This is in contrast with other chapters, such as chapter 7, where a trustee 
is assigned to manage the process on behalf of the debtor as a disinterested third party. 
 18 See BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 1, at 25.; 11 U.S.C. § 1121(a) (2012). The debtor files a plan. 
11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). The debtor must also provide a written disclosure statement that provides “adequate 
information” of the debtor’s financial situation. 
 19 BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 1, at 25. 
 20 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2012). The Code uses a broad definition of claim which encompasses almost 
any right to payment, “whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, 
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured;” 
 21 Id. § 1123(a)(1).  
 22 See id. § 1129(a) (describing that each “holder of a claim or interest” gets to vote to accept a plan of 
reorganization). 
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In addition to classifying claims, the Code specifies that a plan must 
provide for equal treatment of each class of claims and provide “adequate 
means for the plan’s implementation.”23 The plan must also specify each class 
of claims as either impaired or unimpaired.24 In essence, impaired claims are 
those claims held by creditors who are getting a proposed amount that is less 
than what was initially bargained for.25 As § 1124(a)(1) puts it, a creditor’s 
claim under the plan is not impaired if the plan “leaves unaltered the legal, 
equitable, and contractual rights to which such claim or interest entitles the 
holder of such claim or interest,”26 or otherwise restores the claim to its 
unaltered state.27 Therefore, depending on the treatment of each creditor’s 
claim, it will be classified in the debtor’s plan as either impaired or 
unimpaired.28  
The Code specifies that unimpaired claims are presumed to have accepted 
the plan because these creditors are getting the full benefit of their bargain.29 
Thus, unimpaired claims are not entitled to vote on the plan.30 Claims that 
receive no payment are likewise presumed to have rejected the plan, and these 
claims are also not entitled to vote.31 Under the plan, any claim holder who 
gets more than nothing but less than the full amount of its claim is considered 
to have an impaired claim and must vote on the plan with the other claim 
holders within their class.32 Impaired claims, therefore, are the target audience 
of the debtor’s plan of reorganization because, as we will see, the votes of 
these impaired claim holders can ultimately decide whether the business can 
successfully reorganize. 
 
 23 Id. § 1123(a)(5). The “adequate means” may be almost any disposition of the debtor’s assets, up to 
and including complete liquidation. The Code provides a non-exclusive list of these “adequate means” 
including retention of property by the debtor, transfer of property by the debtor, merger of the debtor with 
another entity, sale of property, satisfaction of a lien, and others.  
 24 Id. § 1123(a)(2). 
 25 See id. § 1124. 
 26 Id. § 1124(1). For example, if a creditor holds an unsecured claim of $5,000 with an interest rate of 
5%, payable in 5 years, then this claim will be unimpaired if the debtor’s plan leaves that claim exactly at the 
same terms as of the effective date of the plan. Any modification of the contractual rights of that creditor’s 
claim, even more favorable adjustment, will make the claim impaired. 
 27 Id. §§ 1124(2)(A)–(E). This provision generally deals with situations where a debt has been 
accelerated due to a debtor default. If the default is cured (A) the maturity is reinstated as it originally existed; 
(B) any damages as result of the claim holder’s reliance on the acceleration are compensated; (C) any 
nonmonetary obligations are compensated; (D) and the claim is not otherwise modified; (E) then the claim will 
be deemed to be unimpaired. 
 28 Id. § 1124. 
 29 Id. § 1126(f). 
 30 See id. 
 31 See id. § 1126(g). 
 32 Id. § 1126(a). 
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Once a claim has been labeled as impaired or unimpaired under § 1124, 
titled “Impairment of claims or interest,” the claim will be put into a class 
according to § 1122, titled “Classification of claims or interests.”33 Section 
1122 requires that a plan “may place a claim . . . in a particular class only if 
such claim . . . is substantially similar to the other claims” within the same 
class.34 Because the substantially similar requirement is not defined in the 
Code, the bankruptcy courts have been left to interpret its meaning; the courts 
have “broad discretion in matters of classification.”35  
Generally, courts interpret the substantially similar requirement by 
evaluating “the legal attributes of the claims, not who holds them,” focusing on 
how the “legal character of claim relates to debtor’s assets and whether claims 
exhibit similar effect on the bankruptcy estate.”36 While all claims in a class 
must be substantially similar, not all claims that are substantially similar are 
required to be placed in the same class.37 Debtors are given some latitude to 
classify similar claims in different classes, so long as the purpose for the 
different classification is not manipulation of voting.38 
Once claims have been classified based on their nature, the class must then 
vote on the plan.39 This voting proceeds under § 1126, titled “Acceptance of 
plan” which governs the requirements of voting to approve or reject a plan.40 
For a class to accept a plan, two conditions must be met. First, two-thirds or 
more of the value of the class must approve the plan.41 Second, more than one-
half in number of claims in the class who are impaired must approve the plan42. 
If both the value (two-thirds) of the “yes” votes and number (one-half) of “yes” 
votes meets these conditions, the class will be deemed to have accepted the 
 
 33 Id. §§ 1122(a)–(b). 
 34 Id. § 1122(a). 
 35 Hanson v. First Bank of S.D., N.A., 828 F.2d 1310, 1313 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 36 In re Tribune Co., 476 B.R. 843, 855 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (citing W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. 34 
(D. Del 2012)). 
 37 Hanson, 828 F.2d at 1313. 
 38 See id. The Court in Hanson noted that debtors’ discretion is not unlimited. A debtor cannot 
manipulate the classes to create one class of approving claims to force overall approval of a plan through a 
cramdown proceeding.  
 39 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a) (2012). 
 40 Id. § 1126. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
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plan.43 Only those claims that actually cast a vote count toward the requisite 
one-half and two-thirds calculation.44  
Once all claims have been voted, the next step is plan confirmation under 
§ 1129, titled “Confirmation of plan.”45 This section states that for the overall 
plan to be confirmed, all of the impaired classes must accept the plan under 
§ 1129(a)(8).46 Once the classes of impaired claims have accepted the plan, a 
bankruptcy judge must evaluate the plan and confirm it as long as it meets the 
other requirements of § 1129(a).47 This subsection has fifteen requirements for 
plan confirmation, only one of which is plan acceptance by the impaired 
classes.48 The other significant requirements include that the plan and the 
proponent comply with applicable provisions of the Code, that the plan has 
been proposed in good faith, that the debtor has disclosed the identities and 
affiliations of any individuals proposed to serve in key management positions 
after confirmation, and that each impaired class receive a certain minimum 
amount of payment in the plan, among others.49  
Of these many requirements, the key provision for the purposes of this 
Comment, in addition to § 1129(a)(8) requiring class acceptance, is under 
subsection (a)(10), which states “[i]f a class of claims is impaired under the 
plan, at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted 
the plan, determined without including any acceptance of the plan by any 
insider.”50 Ultimately, under a § 1129(a) confirmation, the court will approve a 
plan if, in addition to the technical and statutory requirements, the debtor can 
create a restructured debt situation that is financially acceptable to a majority 




 43 Id. 
 44 See id. If a class has ten claims, each valued at $100, and each claim holder casts a vote, then at least 
six must approve of the plan and the value of the approval votes must equal at least $700. Practically then, the 
plan must garner seven approval votes in that class to be accepted. However, if only three claim holders cast a 
vote, then only two yes votes are required to approve a plan for that class.  
 45 See id. § 1129. This section governs how the bankruptcy court confirms a plan. If all the requirements 
of subsection (a) or (b) are met, then the court “shall” confirm the plan.  
 46 Id. § 1129(a)(8)(A). 
 47 Id. § 1129(b)(1). 
 48 Id. §§ 1129(a)(1)–(16). 
 49 See id. 
 50 Id. § 1129(a)(10). 
 51 Id. § 1129(a). The statute states that a court “shall” confirm the plan if the requirements of subsection 
(a) are met, this removes any discretion of the court.  
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3. The Cramdown 
If all classes do not approve the plan, the debtor is not out of luck; a 
cramdown is possible. So long as one class of creditors approves a plan, a 
court may confirm a plan as a “cramdown”52 under § 1129(b). In a cramdown, 
the Code removes the requirement of § 1129(a)(8)—requiring the approval of 
all classes—leaving only § 1129(a)(10) as the class voting standard. This 
alternate approval standard requires only one impaired class to accept a plan to 
move on to confirmation so long as the plan meets two additional “fairness” 
requirement.53 All other requirements of the typical confirmation proceeding 
under § 1129(a) remain, but the proponent must show compliance with the 
additional provisions of § 1129(b).54  
These additional provisions set a higher standard for the treatment of the 
non-accepting classes.55 Where under subsection (a) the plan was required to 
only have a good faith standard and meet the additional statutory minimums, 
subsection (b) requires that, with respect to the non-approving classes, the plan 
“does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to each 
class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the 
plan.”56 Subsection (b) imposes these additional requirements on the debtor to 
ensure that a cramdown plan treats secured claim holders, unsecured claim 
holders, and interest holders in a more favorable manner based on their type of 
claim.57 
This higher standard of favorable treatment proposed in the plan is that the 
plan must be (1) fair and equitable and (2) must not discriminate unfairly with 
regard to the classes being crammed down against.58 The Code specifically 
defines what it considers fair and equitable treatment, but does not define how 
courts are to evaluate whether the plan discriminates unfairly.59 For example, if 
a secured claim holder is being crammed down against, to be considered fair 
and equitable under § 1129(b)(2)(A) the plan must provide: 
(i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such 
claims, whether the property subject to such liens is retained by the 
 
 52 See id. § 1129(a)(8); H.R. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
 53 Id. § 1129(a)(8). 
 54 Id. § 1129(b). 
 55 See id. 
 56 Id. § 1129(b)(1). 
 57 See id. §§ 1129(b)(2)(A)–(C). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
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debtor or transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed 
amount of such claims; and 
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of 
such claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed 
amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, 
of at least the value of such holder’s interest in the estate’s interest in 
such property; 
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, or any property 
that is subject to the liens securing such claims, free and clear of such 
liens, with such liens to attach to the proceeds of such sale, and the 
treatment of such liens on proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this 
subparagraph; or 
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent 
of such claims.60 
This high standard of fair and equitable, although relatively complicated, 
ensures that holders of claims being crammed down against receive at least a 
minimum amount of their claim (for secured claims) or receive some amount 
at the expense of junior claim holders (for unsecured claims).61  
When it comes to the requirement that the plan must not discriminate 
unfairly against a class being crammed down against, the Code provides no 
definition and has left it up to the courts to define.62 One bankruptcy court in 
the Southern District of Texas has adopted a popular definition from well 
renowned bankruptcy scholar Bruce Markell.63 This test was described in In re 
Sentry Operating Co of Tex. Inc. as follows: 
. . . a [c]hapter 11 plan is presumptively subject to denial of 
confirmation on the basis of unfair discrimination, even though it 
provides fair and equitable treatment for all classes, when there is (1) 
a dissenting class; (2) another class of the same priority; and (3) a 
difference in the plan’s treatment of the two classes that results in 
either (a) a materially lower percentage recovery for the dissenting 
class (measured in terms of the net present value of all payments), or 
(b) regardless of percentage recovery, an allocation under the plan of 
 
 60 Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A). 
 61 See id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)–(C). 
 62 See In re Sentry Operating Co. of Tex., Inc., 264 B.R. 850, 863–64 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2001) (noting 
that “fair and equitable” is defined, but “discriminates unfairly” is not).  
 63 See id. at 863. 
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materially greater risk to the dissenting class in connection with its 
proposed distribution.64 
Ultimately, a debtor is not required to craft a plan that every class accepts.65 
However, a plan that is rejected by a class must meet both the higher 
cramdown standards examined above66 and every other requirement of 
§ 1129(a) to be confirmed.67 In many single asset bankruptcy proceedings (i.e., 
where a debtor owns one large asset, such as an office building), these higher 
standards have less practical effect on plan confirmation because there will 
usually be only one impaired secured creditor class and one unsecured 
impaired class.68  
Regardless of the type of debtor, in every cramdown proceeding, as well as 
in a regular § 1129(a) proceeding, all claim holders in a class may vote on the 
plan except those creditors classified as “insiders.”69 This point becomes more 
important under a cramdown because in a typical approval process, where all 
classes accept the plan, there is not necessarily a requirement that there be no 
insiders in any class, but that only one of the (potentially many) impaired 
classes be free of insider votes.70 Thus, being labeled an insider can have a 
significant effect on whether a plan is confirmed by the court in a cramdown 
proceeding. 
C. Insiders and their Difficulties  
Currently, the definition of insiders is based on the type of entity of the 
debtor and the entity’s relationship to the creditor.71 Insiders are defined in 
 
 64 Id. (quoting Bruce A. Markell, A New Perspective on Unfair Discrimination in Chapter 11, 72 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 227 (1998). 
 65 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2012). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. § 1129(a). 
 68 Cf. Figter Ltd. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. (In re Figter Ltd.), 118 F.3d 635 (9th Cir. 
1997). Where the major secured creditor (Teachers) had a $17 million claim in its class and the only other 
impaired class was unsecured with a value of only about $22,500. Here the “fair and equitable” requirement 
would require that Teachers retain a lien on the property until paid, which was already part of the debtor’s 
plan, while the “unfair discrimination” requirement did not apply because there were no other classes within 
the same priority.  
 69 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2012). 
 70 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2012), and 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2012), with 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1129(a)(8) (2012). Under a normal approval process, a plan may contain, for example, four impaired classes 
of claims. Assuming all four classes reach the required approval levels, there still only must be one of those 
four that approves without counting the insider vote. This is different in a cramdown, where the debtor is 
forcing the plan onto (potentially many) disapproving creditors. Here the one and only accepting class, must 
also be the class that is free of insider votes. 
 71 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2012). 
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§ 101(31) by listing examples of insiders based on the kind of legal entity of 
the debtor.72 If the debtor is an individual, an insider is defined as a “(i) relative 
of the debtor or a general partner of the debtor; (2) partnership in which the 
debtor is a general partner; (iii) general partner of the debtor; or (iv) 
corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer or person in control.”73 
The Code continues by defining an insider of a corporation as a “(i) director of 
the debtor; (ii) officer of the debtor; (iii) person in control of a debtor; (iv) 
partnership in which the debtor is a general partnership; (v) general partner of 
the debtor; or (vi) relative of a general partner, director, officer or person in 
control of the debtor.”74 The Code continues with similar definitions if the 
debtor is a partnership, a municipality, an affiliate, or managing agent of the 
debtor.75 
The Code defines insiders in a non-exclusive way by using the word 
“includes” in the definition.76 The use of “includes” means that the list of 
insiders outlined above is not exclusive, but rather only examples, thus leaving 
the courts with discretion to interpret into the Code additional examples that 
sufficiently meet the statute’s intent.77 As a result, insiders are generally 
grouped as “statutory” if they clearly fit into the defined categories listed in the 
Code and as “non-statutory” if they do not neatly fit into a specified category.78  
There has been significant debate about what constitutes non-statutory 
insiders, with some courts using a limited definition and some a more 
expansive definition.79 For example in Butler v. Shaw, which is examined more 
in depth later, the Fourth Circuit crafted a limited definition requiring a party 
have significant control of the debtor to be considered an insider for voting 
purposes.80 This narrow view is contrasted with In re Three Flint Hill, where a 
friend and business associate of a partnership was deemed to be an insider for 
voting purposes despite not fitting neatly into the statutory definition.81 These 
conflicting interpretations raise confusion and arguably thwart Congress’s 
 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. § 101(31)(A). 
 74 Id. § 101(31)(B). 
 75 Id. § 101(31). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Rupp v. United Sec. Bank (In re Kunz), 489 F.3d 1072, 1078 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 78 Holly Estes, Transfer of a Claim Held by Insider Does Not an Insider Make, 35 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 
106, Apr. 2016 at 34, 106. 
 79 See Michael Lichtenstein, Who Is an Insider For Voting Purposes in a Single Asset Chapter 11?, 10 
J. BANKR. L & PRAC. 279, 281 (2001). 
 80 See id.  
 81 Id. at 286. 
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goals of having a well-crafted and equitable chapter 11 process because it 
creates a lack of predictability and uniformity in reorganizations. 
D. A Solution to the Insider Problem 
Congress should change how an insider is defined in the Code. 
Specifically, § 101(31) should be amended by removing the word “includes” 
and adding a provision that defines an insider as “any individual with close 
personal or financial relationships with the debtor that, as a result of a less than 
arm’s length transaction, raises a presumption that the individual is beholden to 
the debtor.” This presumption should be rebuttable, thereby shifting the burden 
to the would-be insider to present evidence that the transaction was legitimate. 
This combination of changes will result in an exclusive definition which 
eliminates the need for courts to classify some insiders as “non-statutory” but 
still provides flexibility for courts to make a fact-intensive inquiry.82 The 
proposed change will also cast a wider net by having a statutorily set 
definition, and will reduce the potential for abusive claim sales while 
furthering Congress’s broad intent of treating similarly situated creditors 
similarly.83 
II. BACKGROUND LEGAL DOCTRINES AND CURRENT STATE OF CASE LAW  
A. Equitable Distribution and Claim Selling 
There are two fundamental background legal doctrines and a series of cases 
that will help frame this issue and establish the current legal situation regarding 
bankruptcy insiders. These overarching principles are (1) equitable 
distribution84 and (2) the buying and selling of creditor claims.85 Both are 
interwoven into most insider cases.  
The first, equitable distribution, is a fundamental principle of bankruptcy 
with specific salience in chapter 11 contexts. This is because the definitive goal 
of a restructuring is to “provide fair remedies to creditors generally,” which 
includes an equitable distribution of debtor’s assets to creditors through a valid 
 
 82 See In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d at 1000. The court noted that whether a creditor is an 
insider is factual inquiry that courts must conduct each time there is a claim that a party is a non-statutory 
insider. This fact intensive inquiry cannot be bypassed as a matter of law under the current definition. 
 83 See In re Kunz, 489 F.3d at 1079. 
 84 Id. at 1074. 
 85 See In re Figter Ltd., 118 F.3d 635 (describing the acceptability of claims buying and selling under 
certain conditions). 
GREEN_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS2 12/21/2017 2:08 PM 
2017] AVERTING AN INSIDE JOB 291 
plan of debt restructuring and payments.86 The Tenth Circuit, in Rupp v. United 
Security Bank (In re Kunz), explained that a goal of adherence to the equitable 
distribution principle is to “prevent, within limits, a debtor from giving 
preferred treatment to some creditors in derogation of the interests of other, 
similarly situated creditors.”87 The Code specifically requires this equal 
treatment in a chapter 11 context in § 1123, which, in part, requires that a plan 
“provide the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class, 
unless the holder of a particular claim or interest agrees to a less favorable 
treatment of such claim or interest.”88 Thus, without an acceptably fair and 
equitable distribution of a debtor’s assets under a chapter 11 plan, no creditors 
will vote to accept the plan and it is unlikely to be confirmed.89 
The second essential background doctrine is claim buying and selling.90 
Claim buying occurs when a creditor or third party purchases the claims of 
other creditors to secure the voting rights of those claims under a chapter 11 
bankruptcy.91 In Figter Ltd. v. Teachers Ins. Annuity Ass’n of Am (In re 
Figter), the Ninth Circuit clearly authorized these purchases for legitimate 
purposes.92 In Figter, the owner of an apartment development filed for chapter 
11 bankruptcy and as part of its restructuring plan sought to convert the 
apartments into condominiums against Teachers Insurance Annuity 
Association of America’s (Teachers) wishes.93 Despite their objections, Figter 
intended to cramdown against Teachers (which held a $17.9 million secured 
claim) by gaining approval of the remaining creditors.94  
If these remaining creditors approved the plan, regardless of the amount of 
their collective claims, the plan could be crammed down against Teachers.95 
These creditors all held comparatively small unsecured claims, and the value 
of these claims in total was approximately $22,500.96 To prevent Figter’s 
 
 86 In re Kunz, 489 F.3d at 1074–75. 
 87 Id. at 1075. 
 88 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (2012). 
 89 See id. § 1129 (listing the requirements for a confirmable plan, including acceptance by creditors). 
 90 See generally In re Figter Ltd., 118 F.3d 635. 
 91 Cf. id. (Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America purchased unsecured claims of other 
creditors to increase its voting stake in Figter’s chapter 11 reorganization.). 
 92 Id. at 639. 
 93 Id. at 637. 
 94 Id. 
 95 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2012) (allowing a plan to be confirmed in the face of a disapproving creditor if 
at least one impaired class votes to approve the plan). 
 96 In re Figter Ltd., 118 F.3d at 637. Here, Teachers purchased twenty-one of thirty-four claims (after 
offering to buy all of them) valued at approximately $15,000, making the total amount of all thirty-four claims 
somewhere in the range of $15,000 to $22,500. 
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cramdown against them, Teachers offered to purchase all of these unsecured 
claims (at a higher price than in Figter’s chapter 11 plan) and thereby obtain 
the votes of each claim to vote against Figter’s plan.97 Teachers was able to 
purchase twenty-one of the thirty-four unsecured claims,98 which was enough 
in number and value to prevent Figter’s cramdown.99 
The Figter court allowed Teachers to block this cramdown plan so long as 
the claims were not purchased in “bad faith” or for an “ulterior motive.”100 
Figter argued that the mere fact that Teachers purchased the unsecured claims 
for the express purpose of preventing the plan’s confirmation was evidence of 
bad faith.101 The court rejected this argument.102 Bad faith, the court reasoned, 
would be present if a debtor’s competitor or some other third party purchased 
these claims to block the confirmation, but in this case the purchasing party 
was already a creditor and was seeking to advance its own interests in its “fair 
share of the debtor’s estate.103“  
Figter also argued that Teachers should only be allowed one vote despite 
purchasing twenty-one claims.104 This argument was similarly rejected because 
the Code specifically provides that votes are tallied by claims rather than by 
creditors, so the fact that one creditor held twenty-one claims did not preclude 
that creditor from voting twenty-one times.105 Ultimately, the court approved 
claim selling and purchasing so long as the motive of the purchaser is not bad 
faith.106 This decision paved the way for future claim selling and the concept is 




 97 Id.  
 98 Id. 
 99 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2012). As stated previously, this provision requires greater than one-half in 
number and at least two-thirds in dollar amount of a class to approve a plan. Teacher’s twenty-one purchased 
claims valued at nearly $15,000 was sufficient to prevent this approval.  
 100 In re Figter Ltd., 118 F.3d at 639. 
 101 Id. at 638. 
 102 Id. at 641. 
 103 Id. at 639. 
 104 Id. at 641. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 640. 
 107 See In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d at 999–1000. In this case, claims are validly purchased by 
a third-party.  
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B. Competing Interpretations of Insiders in the Courts  
In addition to the principles of equitable distribution and claim selling, 
there are a significant number of cases (detailed below) that exemplify the 
competing and non-uniform interpretations among courts when resolving cases 
with insider issues.108 Generally, courts either interpret the insider definition 
narrowly or broadly. Courts that narrowly define insiders tend to be more 
common in the chapter 11 context, such as the Ninth Circuit in In re 
Lakeridge.109 However, a few courts, such as the bankruptcy court for 
Maryland, do not follow this trend. There the court, in a chapter 11 proceeding, 
interpreted the non-statutory insider definition broadly in In re Three Flint Hill 
Ltd. P’ship.110  
Issues with insiders arise in areas of bankruptcy outside of the chapter 11 
cramdown context as well.111 Courts have similarly struggled with competing 
interpretations of non-statutory insiders, but in these non-chapter 11 contexts, 
courts tend to have a broader insider interpretation.112 Examples of this more 
inclusive interpretation of insider include, Schubert v. Lucent Tech. Inc. (In re 
Winstar Commc’n), and Unencumbered Assets Trust v. JP Morgan Chase 
Bank (In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters.),113 which both concern voiding asset 
transfers to insiders made on the verge of a bankruptcy filing.114 However, the 
Fourth and Tenth Circuits buck this trend as well, as exemplified in Butler v. 
Shaw Inc., and in Rupp. v. United Sec. Bank (In re Kunz).115 In these cases, the 
courts narrowly interpreted the insider definition.116 After an examination of 
 
 108 Compare In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d at 999–1001, with Schubert v. Lucent Tech., Inc. 
(In re Winstar Commc’n., Inc.), 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 766, at *24–27 (U.S. Bankr. D. Del. May 29, 2003). 
 109 See generally In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d 993. This case is illustrative of courts that 
narrowly define non-statutory insiders in the chapter 11 context, finding that a purported insider who 
purchased claims in order to effectuate a cramdown was not an insider. 
 110 Three Flint Hill Ltd. P’shp. v. Prudential Ins. Co. (In re Three Flint Hill Ltd. Pshp.), 213 B.R. 292, 
299 (D. Md. 1997). 
 111 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012). 
 112 See Anistine v. Carl Zeiss Meditec AG (In re U.S. Medical, Inc.), 531 F.3d 1272, 1279 (10th Cir. 
2008). 
 113 See Rich Mullen, You Asked Your Buddy to Do What? Non-Statutory Insiders and Vote Designation, 
THE WEIL BANKRUPTCY BLOG, https://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com; see also Unencumbered 
Assets Trust v. JP Morgan Chase Bank (In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters.), 604 F. Supp. 2d. 1128, 1162 (So. 
Dist. OH 2009). This blog post examines a chapter 11 case citing support from non-chapter 11 cases, and In re 
Nat’l exemplifies a non-chapter 11 transfer voiding case, which will be further examined below. 
 114 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2012). This provision allows a trustee (the administrator of a chapter 7 
liquidation) to void any transfer of property made to an insider within one year of the debtor’s filing date.  
 115 Butler v. David Shaw, Inc., 72 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 1996); In re Kunz, 489 F.3d at 1074. 
 116 See Butler, 72 F.3d at 442; see also In re Kunz, 489 F.3d at 1079. 
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these cases, it will become clear that this body of law is unpredictable and not 
uniformly applied. 
1. Lakeridge and Narrow Insider Definitions 
The first case this Comment will examine is U.S. Bank N.A. v. Vill. at 
Lakeridge, LLC (In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC).117 The 2016 Lakeridge 
decision is a prominent example of a court’s narrow interpretation of the 
Code’s definition of insider. In Lakeridge, the most recent case weighing in on 
the insider debate, the Ninth Circuit determined that a person with a close 
personal relationship with an insider who purchases a greatly discounted claim 
does not become a statutory or non-statutory insider as a result.118 The 
Lakeridge court also held that a claim-purchasing creditor does not become an 
insider solely by receiving a claim from an insider.119 This 2016 decision was 
significant because it established relatively clear rules for what a non-statutory 
insider (at least in the Ninth Circuit) is not, but the court did not clearly define 
what conduct it would consider worthy of an insider determination.120 
The Village at Lakeridge LLC was a company that owned and managed a 
commercial real estate development in Reno, Nevada.121 Lakeridge purchased 
the development in 2004 with a package of loans provided by Greenwich 
Financial Products and MBP Equity Partners.122 U.S. Bank subsequently 
acquired the promissory note, valued at approximately $10 million, from 
Greenwich Financial.123 MBP Equity Partners, LLC, the sole member of 
Villages at Lakeridge, LLC, financed and held the remaining debt valued at 
approximately $2.76 million.124 In June 2011, Lakeridge filed for chapter 11 
bankruptcy disclosing both U.S. Bank and MBP as its only two creditors with 
U.S. Bank having a fully secured $10 million claim and MBP having an 
unsecured $2.76 million claim.125 Months later, MBP sold their $2.76 million 
claim for $5,000.126 MBP’s board, knowing that it would be unable to vote to 
approve the Lakeridge chapter 11 plan as an insider, approved the sale of this 
 
 117 In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d 993.  
 118 Id. at 1003. 
 119 See generally In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d 993. 
 120 Id. at 1001. 
 121 Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC v. U.S. Bank N.A. (In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC), 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2329, 
at *2 (U.S. B.A.P 9th Cir. 2013).  
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at *2–3. 
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claim to a close friend of Katherine Bartlett, a board member of MBP.127 This 
claim was sold to Dr. Rabkin, who had admittedly close personal and business 
relationships with Ms. Bartlett.128 Interestingly, during Dr. Rabkin’s 
deposition, U.S. Bank, through counsel, offered to purchase Dr. Rabkin’s 
claim for $50,000 and $60,000; both offers were rejected.129 
U.S. Bank argued that this claim should be disallowed for voting purposes 
under the cramdown procedure of § 1129(a)(10) because Dr. Rabkin was either 
a non-statutory insider, became a statutory insider by purchasing the claim 
directly from an insider, or the claim was purchased in bad faith.130 The 
bankruptcy court found that Rabkin was not a non-statutory insider because 
“(a) Dr. Rabkin does not exercise control over the Debtor; (b) Dr. Rabkin does 
not cohabit with Ms. Bartlett and does not pay Ms. Bartlett’s bills or living 
expenses; (c) Dr. Rabkin has never purchased expensive gifts for Ms. 
Bartlett.”131 The bankruptcy court further found the claim was not assigned to 
Rabkin in bad faith.132 Ultimately though, the bankruptcy judge ruled that the 
claim was not entitled to vote because by purchasing the claim from MBP, 
Rabkin acquired “the same status as a statutory insider when he purchased the 
claim.”133 Lakeridge and U.S. Bank appealed to the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel, which overturned the bankruptcy court’s finding that Rabkin 
became a statutory insider solely by assignment of an insider claim.134 U.S 
Bank appealed to the Ninth Circuit.135  
The majority of the Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel and held that: (a) Rabkin did not acquire insider status solely 
by purchasing the claim from an insider,136 and (b) Rabkin was not a non-
statutory insider because his relationship with Bartlett was not sufficiently 
close to “compare with any category listed in § 101(31).”137 The factual 
examination of Bartlett and Rabkin’s relationship, which is triggered by 
 
 127 Id. at *2. 
 128 Id. at *3–4. 
 129 Id. at *4. 
 130 Id. at *37. 
 131 Id. at *18. Although these factual finding seem odd, apparently these facts indicate that Rabkin and 
Bartlett were not in a relationship that resembles a marriage or other close family connection. 
 132 Id. at *26. 
 133 Id. at *19. 
 134 Id. at *23. 
 135 In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d 993. 
 136 Id. at 999. 
 137 Id. at 1003. 
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Rabkin’s potential non-statutory insider status, failed to raise enough concerns 
for the Ninth Circuit to deem Rabkin an insider.138  
Judge Clifton disagreed with the majority’s refusal to classify Rabkin as an 
insider.139 Judge Clifton accepted the legal conclusion that “a person does not 
necessarily become a statutory insider solely by acquiring a claim from a 
statutory insider,” but disagreed with the majority’s willingness to discharge 
Rabkin from the non-statutory category based on the facts presented.140 Judge 
Clifton noted that Rabkin paid only $5,000 for a $2.76 million claim, there was 
no offer made to anyone but Rabkin, there was no negotiation over the price, 
and that Rabkin apparently knew nothing about the financial worthiness of the 
offer.141 To Judge Clifton, Rabkin should have been deemed an insider.142 He 
argued that because the claim sale between MBP and Rabkin met the 
requirement of a less than arm’s length transaction and because Bartlett and 
Rabkin had a close personal relationship that there was clear concern about the 
legitimacy of the deal.143 In the end, Rabkin’s vote was allowed and Lakeridge 
successfully crammed down against U.S. Bank, thus paving the way for plan 
confirmation.144 
In addition to this recent case, there are other cases where courts have 
defined insiders narrowly. In Butler v. Shaw Inc., the Fourth Circuit interpreted 
an insider definition narrowly, finding that to become a non-statutory insider, 
one must exercise “sufficient authority over the debtor to unqualifiedly dictate 
corporate policy and the disposition of corporate assets.”145 Butler sought to 
void a transfer of money he made to Shaw Inc.146 Butler owned a struggling 
car dealership and as part of a deal to prevent failure of the business, Shaw (the 
former owner of the dealership and current owner of the real property) 
liquidated a portion of his ownership in the dealership to Butler.147 Butler then 
used that cash to pay the arrearage of the rent and other payments that were 
due.148  
 
 138 See id. at 1002. 
 139 Id. at 1003 (Clifton, J., dissenting). 
 140 Id. at 1004 (Clifton, J., dissenting). 
 141 Id. (Clifton, J., dissenting). 
 142 Id. at 1006 (Clifton, J., dissenting). 
 143 Id. at 1006–07. 
 144 Id. at 1003. 
 145 Butler, 72 F.3d at 442. (citing In re Babcock Dairy Co, 70 Bankr. 662, 666 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
1986)). 
 146 Id. at 440. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at 439. 
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Butler subsequently filed for bankruptcy and the trustee attempted to void 
the transfers to Shaw Inc. under a theory that Shaw was an insider of the debtor 
by being an affiliate of Butler or by having a close relationship with Butler as a 
former owner.149 If found to be an insider, the court could have voided any 
transfer made within one year of the bankruptcy filing under § 547.150 The 
court rejected the affiliate argument because, at the time of the transfer, Shaw 
was not an affiliate as defined in the Code because he had ceased to be an 
affiliate the day prior to the challenged transfers.151 The Fourth Circuit rejected 
Butler’s second argument, that Shaw was an insider based on his close 
relationship with Butler, because the court believed that to be a non-statutory 
insider, the alleged creditor-insider must have a significant level of control 
over the debtor.152 Even though Shaw retained the title of manager at the car 
dealership,153 the court believed that he did not exercise sufficient control over 
the company and was therefore not an insider.  
Lakeridge and Butler are just two examples of courts’ narrow construction 
of the non-statutory insider definition in §§ 1129 and 547, respectively. The 
final narrow interpretation case is Rupp. v. United Security Bank (In re 
Kunz).154 In this chapter 7 case, the Tenth Circuit determined that United 
Security Bank was not an insider of a former member (Mr. Kunz) of a bank’s 
board of directors despite Kunz’s title of “director emeritus.”155 Here, Mr. 
Kunz, a retired banker, filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy and the trustee attempted 
to void payments that Mr. Kunz had made to United as part of significant debts 
he owed.156 In the year prior to Mr. Kunz’s filing he paid United Bank 
approximately $250,000.157 The trustee moved to void these payments under 
§ 547(b), which limits preferential transfers on the eve of bankruptcy, because 
Mr. Kunz was a director of the bank and therefore the bank was an insider to 
Mr. Kunz.158 The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument on the grounds that Mr. 
Kunz was a “director emeritus” which was significantly different than a 
“director,” and therefore did not meet the statutory criteria of an insider.159 The 
 
 149 Id. at 440. 
 150 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (2012). 
 151 Butler, 72 F.3d at 440. 
 152 Id. at 442. 
 153 Id. at 440. 
 154 In re Kunz, 489 F.3d 1072.  
 155 Id. at 1080. 
 156 Id. at 1075. 
 157 Id. at 1076. 
 158 Id. at 1075. 
 159 Id. at 1080. 
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court further argued that there was not the required element of control present 
in the facts to consider United a non-statutory insider.160  
2. Three Flint Hill and Broad Interpretations of Insider 
While the Ninth, Fourth, and Tenth Circuit Courts issued rulings that 
narrowly define insiders, there are those that have rejected a narrow definition 
of a non-statutory insider. One significant case where a court broadly 
interpreted a claim transferee as an insider as part of its chapter 11 petition is 
Three Flint Hill Ltd. P’Ship v. Prudential Ins. Co (In re Three Flint Hill Ltd. 
P’ship).161  
In Three Flint Hill, the debtor limited partnership (Three Flint Hill) owned 
and operated an office building as its sole asset.162 Prudential made a nearly 
$20 million loan to Three Flint Hill to finance the building.163 After a few 
years, the office building’s only tenant chose not to renew the lease and the 
owners were unable to secure a new tenant.164 Three Flint Hill filed a petition 
for chapter 11 to prevent foreclosure, and eventually submitted a plan of 
reorganization.165  
Three Flint Hill’s plan proposed to pay less than half of the amount owed 
on the Prudential loan while fully repaying its unsecured creditors within six 
months of plan confirmation.166 Not surprisingly, Prudential voted not to 
approve this plan, thus requiring a cramdown vote for the unsecured impaired 
class of claims.167 Prudential subsequently began the process of purchasing 
these remaining claims from the various unsecured creditors.168 At the same 
time, Three Flint Hill representatives approached a friendly business associate, 
Mr. Bonderman of Tarrant Limited Partnerships (Tarrant), in order to have 
Tarrant purchase some of the unsecured claims as well.169 Bonderman and 
Tarrant purchased forty-seven claims and voted to approve Three Flint Hill’s 
reorganization plan in a cramdown.170  
 
 160 Id. at 1079. 
 161 See In re Three Flint Hill Ltd. P’ship, 213 B.R. 292. 
 162 Id. at 295. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. at 296. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
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Prudential objected to Tarrant’s vote, arguing that Tarrant and Bonderman 
were non-statutory insiders of Three Flint Hill.171 The bankruptcy court and, on 
appeal, the U.S. District Court for Maryland agreed that Tarrant was an insider 
of Three Flint Hill because Bonderman (as Tarrant’s principal) purchased the 
forty-seven claims as a favor to Three Flint Hill and not because he was 
making “a carefully reasoned business decision.”172 Thus, Bonderman’s 
relationship with Three Flint Hill, when combined with the less than arm’s 
length transaction, was sufficient to bring Tarrant within the scope of a non-
statutory insider despite having no control over Three Flint Hill.173  
Three Flint Hill directly contrasts with the Lakeridge decision, where the 
court found that a similar transaction between a debtor and friendly business 
partner did not constitute and insider transaction.174 It is unclear what caused 
these courts to come to divergent opinions, but it seems that the courts are left 
with significant discretion and a lack of a clear analytical structure when 
determining who is or is not an insider based on the Code’s less-than ideal 
definition. Interestingly, both courts cite the same Code provision,175 the same 
legislative history,176 and even the same case,177 yet came to different 
conclusions. 
In situations that are outside the chapter 11 claim selling contexts, such as 
those that involve the voiding of transfers from debtors to insiders, courts 
appear more willing to broadly construe the definition to capture more 
insiders.178 Most insider status litigation occurs in this non-chapter 11 arena.179 
This alternative instance of the Code’s use of the term “insider” occurs in what 
is known as preferential transfer context under § 547(b)(4)(B).180 This section 
provides that a trustee (under chapter 7) or debtor-in-possession (under chapter 
11) may void a property transfer made within a certain time before the filing of 
a bankruptcy petition and bring that property back into the estate.181 Transfers 
made to persons other than insiders have a ninety-day reach back window 
 
 171 Id. at 297. 
 172 Id. at 298. 
 173 Id. at 300. 
 174 See In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d 993. 
 175 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2012). 
 176 See 11 U.S.C. §101 (2012); see also S. REP. 95-989, at 25 (1978), as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 
5810.  
 177 See In re Friedman, 126 B.R. 63 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Cal. 1991). 
 178 See id. 
 179 See In re Gilbert, 104 B.R. 206, 210 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989). 
 180 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (2012). 
 181 Id. 
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within which the trustee can void the transfer and bring the property back into 
the estate’s possession.182 Alternatively, property transferred to an insider is 
recoverable as far back as one year prior to the debtor’s filing.183 The differing 
treatment is intended to prevent abuse and stop the debtor from giving, selling, 
or otherwise transferring debtor property to an insider on the eve of a 
bankruptcy filing.184 
The claim transfer avoidance body of law is generally more inclusive in 
defining non-statutory insiders and courts evaluate the facts of the debtor-
claimholder transaction with a focus on “(1) the closeness of the relationship 
between the parties and (2) whether the transaction was negotiated at arm’s 
length.”185 The Tenth Circuit has defined in detail the purpose of § 547 of the 
Code in In re PERMA PAC. PROPS, when it stated that: 
It is the ultimate aim of the preference law in the Bankruptcy Code to 
ensure that all creditors receive an equal distribution from the 
available assets of the debtor . . . . Although the intent or state of 
mind of the parties is not materially dispositive of whether or not a 
transfer is a preference . . . we can see no impediment to allowing the 
bankruptcy court to look at the nature of the transaction and the 
relationship among the parties.186 
Cases that have a generally expansive interpretation of insider include 
Schubert v. Lucent Tech. Inc. (In re Winstar Commc’n), and Unencumbered 
Assets Trust v. JP Morgan Chase Bank (In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters).187  
In Schubert v. Lucent Tech. Inc. (In re Winstar Commc’n), the debtor 
Winstar attempted to recover $194 million payment it made to Lucent 
Technologies as part of a financing package that was supposed to be used to 
expand Lucent’s telecommunication network through a continuing strategic 
partnership.188 Lucent quickly defaulted on their payments to Winstar.189 
Winstar was subsequently unable to pay its other existing debt obligations 
(unrelated to Lucent) and filed for bankruptcy approximately five months after 
its Lucent loan.190 Winstar claimed that this transfer of $194 million to Lucent 
 
 182 Id. § 547(b)(4)(A). 
 183 Id. § 547(b)(4)(B). 
 184 See In re PERMA PAC. PROPS., 983 F.2d 964, 968 (10th Cir. 1992). 
 185 Rich Mullen, supra note 113. 
 186 In re PERMA PAC. PROPS., 983 F.2d at 968. 
 187 See Rich Mullen, supra note 113. 
 188 In re Winstar Commc’n., Inc., 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 766, at *24. 
 189 Id. at *5–6. 
 190 Id. at *6. 
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should be avoided as a preferential transfer to an insider.191 Winstar argued that 
their relationship with Lucent was sufficiently close and that Lucent 
maintained enough control over them financially, that Lucent should be 
considered an insider and have the $194 million payment avoided under 
§ 547(b)(4)(B).192  
Both the bankruptcy court for the District of Delaware and the U.S. District 
Court agreed that Lucent was an insider of Winstar under both a statutory and 
non-statutory analysis.193 Under a statutory analysis, the bankruptcy court 
found that Lucent was a “person in control” of debtor under 101(31)(B)(iii).194 
Lucent was a “person in control” because it was able to dictate “Winstar’s 
purchasing decisions” and also induce Winstar to transfer the $194 million or it 
“would terminate negotiations . . . and refuse further financing.”195  
Similarly, under a non-statutory analysis, the district court believed that 
Lucent was an insider of Winstar because the relationship was “more than a 
mere debtor-creditor relationship conducted at arm’s length,” and also was 
“sufficiently close.”196 The district court, extracting this language directly from 
the legislative history of the definition of insider as described in Butler v. 
Shaw, applied this analysis to the Lucent-Winstar transaction and determined 
that Lucent should be considered a non-statutory insider as well.197 This case is 
significant because it deemed a creditor, without actual control of the debtor, 
an “insider” by focusing on the parties’ relationship and the legitimacy of the 
transaction.198 This is in contrast to Lakeridge and Shaw where the courts 
interpreted a narrower class of insiders while examining the same factors, 
finding the “control” requirement more important and the relationship-
transaction requirement less important.  
In Unencumbered Assets Trust v. JP Morgan Chase Bank (In re Nat’l 
Century Fin. Enters.), the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio 
examined insiders under § 547 and found that a relatively liberal definition 
should apply in non-statutory insider situations.199 In this case, the court sought 
 
 191 Id. at *25. 
 192 Id.  
 193 Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Shubert (In re Winstar Commc’n., Inc..), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31137, at *7 
(D. Del. Apr. 26, 2007). 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. at *8. 
 196 Id. at *7–8. 
 197 Id. at *7. 
 198 See id. at *7–8. 
 199 See In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., 604 F. Supp. 2d at 1160. 
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to invalidate certain cash transfers from a debtor200 under a § 547(b)(4)(B) 
argument similar to the claim in Winstar.201 This court agreed that an insider is 
generally “one who does not deal at arm’s length with the debtor.”202 The court 
went on to cite In re Friedman, which stated that: 
insider status may be based on a professional or business relationship 
with the debtor ‘where such relationship compels the conclusion that 
the individual or entity has a relationship with the debtor, close 
enough to gain an advantage attributable simply to affinity rather 
than to the course of business dealings with the parties.203 
Due to such an affinity, the court in In re Nat’l Century voided a $100 million 
transfer from a debtor to an insider, holding that this was “a situation that 
implicates the very reason why the Bankruptcy Code has a provision for 
avoiding transfers to insiders.”204 
It seems clear that the competing interpretations of various courts’ 
construction of the non-statutory insider definition has led to starkly different 
outcomes. This imprecise term leads to especially unpredictable results when a 
potential insider does not meet the strict definition of a § 101(31) insider. 
Surely, this outcome is not Congress’s intent and has led to opportunities for 
abuse that further thwart bankruptcy’s policy goal of equitable distribution to 
creditors. Additionally, the varied outcomes from courts has the potential to 
lead to forum shopping.  
III. A PROPOSAL: NEW STATUTORY DEFINITION OF INSIDER 
This Comment argues for a new rule to be codified to address this split 
among jurisdictions that has arisen due to the inconsistent judicial 
interpretation of the term “insider” as defined in § 101(31). Congress should 
change how an insider is defined in the Code. Insider should be defined by 
removing the word “includes” from the Code205 and replacing it with “means,” 
thus making the definition exclusive. Next, the Code should include a catchall 
 
 200 Id. 
 201 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (2012). This Code provision provides that transfer from a debtor to an 
insider may be voided if that transfer occurred between ninety days and one year of the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition. Similar to the chapter 11 voting restriction on transferring claims to insiders, this 
provision is intended to prevent abuse by preventing a debtor, on the verge of bankruptcy, from transferring 
assets just prior to filing.  
 202 In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., 604 F. Supp. 2d at 1161. 
 203 In re Friedman, 126 B.R. at 70. 
 204 In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., 604 F. Supp. 2d at 1161. 
 205 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2012). 
GREEN_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS2 12/21/2017 2:08 PM 
2017] AVERTING AN INSIDE JOB 303 
provision at the end of the definition. This new sub-paragraph “G” should 
state, “any person with a close personal or financial relationship with the 
debtor that, as a result of a less than arm’s length transaction, becomes 
beholden to the debtor, raises a presumption that the person is an insider.”206 
This argument will advance in three stages. First, I will examine 
Congress’s intent in creating an insider rule by looking at the legislative 
history of the term when enacted under the 1978 Code. Next, I will explain the 
mechanics of this proposed rule and explain the two-step analysis courts 
should use when confronted with a chapter 11 claim transfer. Finally, I will 
address possible counterarguments and the continued issues that will inevitably 
arise with insider determinations.  
A. Examination of “Insider” Legislative Intent 
The definition and application of insiders throughout the Code should meet 
Congress’s intent when the term was initially adopted 1978. These intents 
include: (1) to prevent bankruptcy abuse; (2) to treat similar creditors similarly; 
and (3) to evenly distribute debtor assets. Courts and commentators have 
uneasiness with current state of insider interpretation.207 As mentioned above, 
the dissenting judge in In re Lakeridge disagreed with the majority’s 
application of the facts to law.208 In his dissent, Judge Clifton agreed that a 
non-statutory insider exists when there is a comparably close debtor-creditor 
relationship to those enumerated in § 101(31), and the “relevant transaction is 
negotiated at less than arm’s length.”209 He believed that the facts supported a 
finding that there was a close Rabkin-Bartlett relationship and the transaction 
was not arm’s length, thus Rabkin was an insider.  
Many commentators have recommended a change, predicted abuse, or 
anticipated litigation based on the conflicting interpretations issued by courts 
and the non-exclusive nature of 101(31).210 In one law firm alert article titled 
Ninth Circuit Issues Controversial Opinion Limiting Insider Status for 
Purposes of Voting on a Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization, the authors note 
that the Lakeridge decision has “arguably provide[d] a roadmap for debtors to 
circumvent the requirement in § 1129(a)(10).”211 The path for these potentially 
unscrupulous debtors, according to the author, is to “simply sell their 
unsecured claims for a nominal amount to friendly third parties that will vote 
in favor of the plan.”212 It seems apparent that this end-run around the 
 
 206 Id. This Code section currently states that “[t]he term ‘insider’ includes—” and ends at subparagraph 
F. This modified definition would add an additional subparagraph “G” as a catchall. 
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requirements of chapter 11’s finely crafted cramdown procedure was likely not 
Congress’s intent when enacting the Code. 
A leading treatise on bankruptcy, Collier on Bankruptcy, describes 
insiders, not by enumerating specific insider relationships (as does the Code), 
but by focusing on the closeness of the relationship and the existence of a less 
than arm’s length transaction.213 Accordingly, Congress should codify this 
descriptive definition rather than attempting to narrowly define specific 
examples of insiders as it currently does in the Code.214 
An examination of the legislative history of the enactment of this provision 
reveals support for a modified definition. Insiders are defined in § 101(31) of 
the Code using the word “includes” followed by a list.215 Using rules of 
statutory construction, courts have determined that the list is not exclusive216 
but only illustrative, thus giving rise to statutory, or per se, insiders and non-
statutory insiders.217  
The term “insider” was enacted with the 1978 Code.218 Legislative intent of 
the “insider” term is relatively sparse and less than satisfactory,219 but the 
Senate Report that accompanied the 1978 enactment of the Code does state a 
guiding principle that an insider “is one who has a sufficiently close 
relationship with the debtor that his conduct is made subject to closer scrutiny 
 
 207 See Sarah Borders, Jeffrey Dutson, Ninth Circuit Issues Controversial Opinion Limiting Insider 
Status for Purposes of Voting on a Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization, King and Spalding: Client Alert, Feb. 
16, 2016. 
 208 In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d at 1003. 
 209 Id. 
 210 See Rebecca Revich, The KERP Revolution, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 87, 2007. 
 211 Sarah Borders, Jeffrey Dutson, Ninth Circuit Issues Controversial Opinion Limiting Insider Status for 
Purposes of Voting on a Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization, King and Spalding: Client Alert, Feb. 16, 2016. 
 212 Id. 
 213 In re U.S. Medical, Inc., 531 F.3d at 1277 (citing 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 547.03[6] (Allen N. 
Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th rev. ed. 2008)). 
 214 11 U.S.C. §101(31) (2012). 
 215 Id. 
 216 Borders, supra note 211. 
 217 In re Kunz, 489 F.3d 1072 (quoting Miller Avenue Professional & Promotional Serv. v. Brady (In re 
Enterprise Acquisition Partners), 319 B.R. 626, 631 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004)). 
 218 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2012); see also S. REP. 95-989 at 25 (stating that the term “insider” is new 
for the 1978 enactment of the Code). This year saw the codification the Code largely as it is today, and with 
such a large Code, the legislative reports accompanying its enactment for the most part give only basic 
background information and intent. 
 219 Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 941, 959–60 
(1978).  
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than those dealing at arm’s length with the debtor.”220 Although Congress 
chose to define insiders in this way in their committee report, Congress chose 
to enact the Code provision differently.221  
Rather than using a descriptive definition, Congress instead defined insider 
using an inclusive list as examples, explaining later in the Senate Report that 
some provisions are “open-ended because the term[s] [are] not susceptible of 
precise specification.”222 Thus, Congress intentionally left the courts with the 
ability to determine what relationships are sufficient to meet the insider status 
by “us[ing] the characterization provided in this definition.”223  
Congress’s purpose of including insiders in the Code was to reach a broad 
scope of persons who are not true creditors of the debtor, but are instead “alter 
egos” of the creditor and therefore will not act in the best interest of other 
similarly situated creditors.224 Congress defined insiders in such a way that left 
significant discretion for the courts to craft and develop the body of insider 
law.225 Courts have significantly departed from Congress’s intent and thereby 
created a confusing and non-uniform body of law that may only be corrected 
by modifying the Code.226  
B. Mechanics of Proposed Definition’s Application 
Accordingly, § 101(31) should be changed in two ways. First, Congress 
should remove the “includes” language from the definition of insiders to make 
the definition exclusive, thus removing all “non-statutory” discussion. Second, 
the Code should include a catch-all provision at the end of the definition that 
provides a statutory analytical framework for determining if a person is an 
insider.  
1. An Exclusive Insider Definition 
Much of the litigation surrounding insider determination occurs because 
the Code is defined using an inclusive rather than an exclusive definition, 
 
 220 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2012); see also S. REP. 95-989 at 25. 
 221 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (defining “insiders” differently than they described “insiders.”). 
 222 S. REP. 95-989 at 35 (explaining that there are a number of Code provisions that are left open-ended, 
such as “security,” “entity,” “insider,” and “person.”). 
 223 Id. 
 224 In re Blaine Richards & Co., 10 B.R. 424, 432 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y 1981). 
 225 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2012) (Congress’s use of the words “includes” created this discretion). 
 226 Compare In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d 993, with In re Three Flint Hill Ltd. P’ship, 213 
B.R. 292 (two courts come to opposite conclusions based on very similar facts).  
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which creates two categories of insiders.227 Much of the debate and uncertainty 
that goes along with non-statutory insiders would be avoided by making the 
definition exclusive and thereby eliminating the non-statutory distinction 
altogether. Under this proposed modification, this change would remove some 
of this uncertainty by making every would-be insider a “statutory” insider and 
focus the courts on examining the relationship of the parties and the nature of 
the transaction, which more aligns with Congress’s original intent.228 This 
change can be effectuated by changing the word “includes” to “means.”229  
2. The Statutory Catchall and its Application 
The second, and more significant, change is to add a catchall provision 
(becoming subsection “G”) at the end of the definition, which should state: 
“any person with close personal or financial relationships with the debtor that, 
as a result of a less than arm’s length transaction, becomes beholden to the 
debtor, raises a presumption that the person is an insider.” This portion of the 
definition can be divided into three subparts and applied in three steps.  
a. The Close Relationship Test 
The first step of analysis under this Comment’s proposed Code definition 
is showing evidence of a close personal or financial relationship creating a 
creditor that is beholden to the debtor. The fact-intensive inquiry would allow 
courts some flexibility to determine what type of financial and personal 
relationship should be sufficient to raise a concern about a potential insider 
status. This inquiry should focus on the nature of the relationship—whether 
business, personal, or mixed—between the creditor and debtor, the length of 
the relationship, and the course of dealings between the parties, amongst 
others. This inquiry should be relatively inclusive and broad in order to catch 
as many purported insiders as possible. 
This notion that the suspect relationship could be broad is supported in In 
re Locke Mill Partners, where the court noted that insider status should apply 
to a potentially broad range of parties.230 Keeping this inquiry relatively broad 
in scope is appropriate because Congress intended a relatively broad scope 
when enacting this definition in the 1978 Code.231 Casting a wide net at this 
 
 227 In re Kunz, 489 F.3d at 1075. 
 228 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2012); see also S. REP. 95-989 at 25. 
 229 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2012). 
 230 In re Locke Mill Partners, 178 B.R. 697, 702 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1995). 
 231 See S. REP. 95-989 at 35. 
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step will also allow the courts to move on to steps two and three of the analysis 
where the real substance of the test lies. Furthermore, this is appropriate 
because the initial burden will be on the party challenging the transaction 
(most often the creditor) and thus that party will have to provide evidence that 
this pre-existing relationship legitimately raises some kind of conflict of 
interest.  
Another key requirement at this step is that the relationship and the 
transaction in question must combine to make the claim holding creditor 
beholden to the debtor. If a person with this pre-existing relationship accepts a 
claim from a debtor that is akin to what the Lakeridge dissent considered 
“doing a favor for a friend,” then they must be deemed to be beholden to the 
debtor.232 This analysis overlaps with the next step and will provide the court 
with a link between the relationship of the parties and the specific transaction 
being challenged. 
b. The Less Than Arm’s Length Transaction Test 
Part two of the rule requires the party claiming that an insider should exist 
provide a factual basis to support a finding that a less than arm’s length 
transaction took place. The Lakeridge dissent looked to Black’s Law 
Dictionary and defined an arm’s length transaction as “1. A transaction 
between two unrelated and unaffiliated parties. 2. A transaction between two 
parties, however closely related they may be, conducted as if the parties were 
strangers, so that no conflict of interest arises.”233 This fact-intensive inquiry is 
indeed the main crux of the new definition because the prevention of abuse, 
through fraudulent claim selling to a friendly third-party, is the primary goal of 
this change. A less than arm’s length transaction in an insider context would be 
any transaction between a debtor and a claim-purchasing creditor where a 
potential conflict of interest arises. To determine whether a conflict of interest 
arises in an insider context, courts examine the motives of the parties when 
entering into the transaction234 and the price paid for the claim.235  
Bankruptcy courts have considered non-arm’s length transactions in the 
insider context and have developed one relatively straightforward definition.236 
 
 232 In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d at 1003–04. 
 233 Id. at 1005 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)).  
 234 See In re Three Flint Hill L.P., 213 B.R. at 301. 
 235 See In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 813 F.3d 993 (dissent states that $5,000 paid for a claim worth 
over $2 million raised a concern about the legitimacy of the transaction). 
 236 In re Three Flint Hill L.P., 213 B.R. at 299. 
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In In re Three Flint Hill L.P., the Maryland bankruptcy court defined an arm’s 
length transaction as “one entered into in good faith in the ordinary course of 
business by unrelated parties with independent interests.”237 In In re Three 
Flint Hill, a business associate (Tarrant) of the debtor (Three Flint Hill) 
purchased $123,000 of debt claims to help the debtor get their chapter 11 plan 
approved.238 The bankruptcy court and the district court found that Tarrant was 
an insider of Three Flint Hill because the claims were purchased to help out a 
friend rather than as a “carefully reasoned business decision.”239 When facts 
like these are present, they indicate that the motives of the parties are self-
seeking, rather than seeking to maximize the distribution of the debtor’s estate, 
and thus not arm’s length.  
c. The Rebuttable Presumption of Insider Status 
Part three of this new catchall insider definition is the creation of a 
rebuttable presumption of insider status. Under this proposed definition, once a 
transfer meets the two-part (relationship and transaction) test laid out above, 
there would be a presumption of insider status. This presumption (that the 
transferee is an insider) would shift the burden to the debtor to show sufficient 
evidence of: (1) a lack of a sufficiently close relationship; (2) that the 
transaction was conducted at arm’s length; or (3) other evidence to remove the 
taint of the transaction. Currently, the burden rests with the party challenging 
the transaction (usually a creditor), to show that the alleged insider deal was 
less than arm’s length.240 Ideally, the party with the best ability to prove or 
disprove a claim (i.e., the one with the best access to the evidence) should 
logically have the burden of proof.  
This proposed burden shifting is appropriate because in bankruptcy cases 
like these, specifically in the claim selling and voidable transfer contexts, the 
party transferring a claim to a purported insider has the best knowledge of 
whether that individual is an insider, so it stands to reason that the burden of 
disproving insider status should remain with that party.241 Such evidence could 
include information about the nature of the relationship between the parties, 
the conduct of the transaction, or any other evidence that could prevent a court 
 
 237 Id. at 300 (quoting In re Valley Steel Corp., 182 B.R. 728, 735 (W.D.Va.1995)). 
 238 Id. at 296. 
 239 Id. at 299. 
 240 See In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d at 1003 (where the court stated that U.S. Bank did not 
present enough evidence to show that Rabkin was a non-statutory insider). 
 241 See id. at 1005 (where MBP had all of the information regarding the relationship between Bartett and 
Rabkin, yet U.S. Bank had the burden of proving that Rabkin was an insider). 
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from finding that the parties’ relationship and transaction “compels the 
conclusion that the individual or entity has a relationship with the debtor, close 
enough to gain an advantage attributable simply to affinity rather than to the 
course of business dealings between the parties.”242 
IV. BENEFITS OF PROPOSED DEFINITION AND COUNTERARGUMENTS 
This Code modification will better meet Congress’s goals of reducing 
bankruptcy abuse, providing equitable distribution of the debtor’s assets, and 
reducing the possibility of forum shopping by debtors. 
A. Prevention of Chapter 11 Abuse 
This modified definition should make it easier for courts to identify and 
prevent bankruptcy abuse. The dissenting opinion by Judge Clifton in 
Lakeridge laid bare a clear example of an abusive transfer intended to assure 
plan confirmation: sell the voting power to a friendly third party for less than 
fair value in exchange for a “yes” vote.243 An article published by bankruptcy 
practitioners Sarah Borders and Jeffery Dutson also noted serious concerns that 
debtors could “circumvent the requirements in [§] 1120(a)(10)” of the Code.244 
The authors argued that the “roadmap” to securing an approval in a cramdown 
was clearly laid out by the Lakeridge decision.245 They note that under the 
current system insiders can “simply sell their unsecured claims for a nominal 
amount to friendly third parties that will vote in favor of the plan.”246 Clearly 
this scheming conduct violates Congress’s goals of maximizing the equitable 
distribution of the debtor’s estate. Furthermore, this change will provide 
bankruptcy courts with another tool to police the current system and fulfill 
their role as supervisor of unwarranted preferential treatment.247 
This definition brings every insider into the statute and gives courts a 
concrete, statutorily mandated framework to determine if insider transfers are 
being made. The transfer that occurred in Lakeridge would likely have been 
deemed an insider transaction because it met both parts of the initial insider 
test because the claim holder, Rabkin, had a significant personal and financial 
relationship with Bartlett and also purchased the more than $2,000,000 claim 
 
 242 In re Friedman, 125 B.R. at 70. 
 243 In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d at 1005 (Clifton, J., dissenting). 
 244 Borders, supra note 211. 
 245 Id. 
 246 Id. 
 247 In re U.S. Medical, 531 F.3d at 1275 (quoting In re Kunz, 489 F.3d at 1077). 
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for a nominal value.248 This new provision will provide a concrete tool to 
enable the courts to recognize abuses and empower them to prevent similar 
abuses in the future. One court has said that “the purpose of this inquiry is to 
guard against collusive approval of plans by persons whose dealing with the 
debtor are “at less than arm’s length.”249 This modified insider definition will 
enable the courts to do this.  
B. Improving Equitable Distribution 
The improved definition will also ensure equitable distribution among 
creditors. A major goal of the enactment of the Code, beginning as far back as 
the first enactment of a national bankruptcy statute in 1898, was to protect 
debtors and prevent hardships and injustices to creditors250 by providing for 
equal distribution to similarly situated creditors.251 The sale of economically 
unjustified claims to insider-like persons for the purpose of foisting a plan 
upon other creditors defeats this longstanding goal. As the court stated in In re 
U.S. Medical, one of the goals of bankruptcy law is to “prevent, within limits, a 
debtor from giving preferred treatment to some creditors in derogation of the 
interests of other, similarly situated creditors.”252  
The proposed definition of insider will better meet these goals of equitable 
distribution and equitable creditor treatment by providing a more concrete and 
broad definition. A court can then better fulfill its role as supervisor to prevent 
potential “unwarranted preferential treatment.”253 By analyzing the debtor’s 
relationship to the claim holder the court will learn if there is an unwarranted 
affinity, then by further examining the transaction itself to figure out if it was 
conducted at arm’s length, the court can confirm or deny that affinity and 
presume the claim holder is an insider. The initial burden of proof is 
appropriately on the other claim holding creditors, as theirs is the interest being 
harmed by the insider-debtor collusion. Once the presumption is triggered, the 
debtor is best situated to rebut this presumption to the satisfaction of the court, 
ensuring that any initial misgivings about the relationship and the transaction 
were unwarranted, thereby ensuring that all creditors are being treated 
equitably, thus meeting Congress’s intent.254 
 
 248 See In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d at 1003. 
 249 In re Three Flint Hill Ltd. P’ship, 213 B.R. at 299. 
 250 In re Nash, 249 F. 375, 377 (S.D.W.Va. 1918). 
 251 Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990). 
 252 In re U.S. Medical, 531 F.3d at 1275 (quoting In re Kunz, 489 F.3d at 1074–75). 
 253 Id. at 1275 (quoting In re Kunz, 489 F.3d at 1074–75). 
 254 See id. (citing In re Kunz, 489 F.3d at 1074–75 (discussing the purpose of bankruptcy law)).  
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C. Prevention of Forum Shopping 
The Code alteration also has the potential to prevent forum shopping by 
unprincipled debtors. The Central District of California, when examining the 
merits of a bankruptcy related motion,255 defined forum shopping as “a party 
attempt[ing] to manipulate an action to have it heard before a forum it deems 
more favorable, charitable, or sympathetic toward its point of view.”256 
Assuming a debtor may have more than one choice for forum when 
contemplating bankruptcy, the debtor may seek a forum with a narrow insider 
definition to gain a favorable advantage.257 For example, a court that follows 
the Lakeridge precedent may determine that a close friend of an insider is not a 
non-statutory insider and allow that friend to purchase an unsecured claim for a 
nominal value in order to force approval other claim holders. If this 
hypothetical debtor intends to use a cramdown as part of a chapter 11 
proceeding, they may choose the more favorable forum to manipulate an 
advantage over other creditors. Under the proposed modified definition of 
insider, courts will not have the same variance in their categorization of non-
statutory insiders as they do now and the effect of forum shopping for an 
insider favorable court would be reduced.  
All things considered, the benefits of the proposed change are potentially 
significant. The change will diminish abuse of the chapter 11 bankruptcy 
process by preventing less than arm’s length claim sales between friendly 
parties, afford more equitable distribution of a debtor’s assets by casting a 
wider insider net and thereby maximizing estate values, and reducing the 
incentive for debtors to forum shop bankruptcy courts for those with favorable 
interpretation of non-statutory insiders. A final benefit flowing from this 
change is greater economic value to creditors. For example, in Lakeridge, 
Rabkin stood to earn $55,000 on the claims he purchased from MBP if he had 
sold them to U.S. Bank.258 This is considerably more than he stood to make if 
he held the claims as an investment and hoped to make money as part of 
Lakeridge’s plan.  
 
 255 See Gottlieb v. Landau (In re KSL Media, Inc.), No. CV 15-08748-AB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1917, 
at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2016). 
 256 Id. at *28 (quoting Calvert v. Berg, No. C13-1019, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94874, at *5 (W.D. Wash. 
July 8, 2013). 
 257 Compare In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d at 1003–04 (where the court applied a narrow 
definition of insider), with In re Three Flint Hill Ltd. Pshp., 213 B.R. 2 at 299. 
 258 In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d at 998 (Rabkin was offered $50,000 and then $60,000 by U.S. 
Bank for the claims he purchased for $5,000.). 
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D. Counterarguments 
There are three potential counterarguments for the proposed definition 
change. The first is that the definition does not address the “control” aspect 
identified by many courts as an important factor in determining a party’s 
insider status. The second is that the change does not allow courts to have an 
in-depth factual inquiry, but instead requires them to make determinations as a 
matter of law, which could lead to unreasonable results. The final 
counterargument is that the scope of the new definition is too broad and will 
unduly harm debtors’ legitimate reorganization efforts. 
Many courts have inquired into the level of “control” of the insider over 
the debtor, but under this new definition such an inquiry would not be required 
to classify a person or individual as a non-statutory insider.259 The Fourth 
Circuit, in In re Gilbert has argued, “the alleged insider must exercise 
sufficient authority over the debtor so as to unqualifiedly dictate corporate 
policy and the disposition of corporate assets.”260 Other courts have disagreed 
with this analysis, arguing that control is not dispositive.261 Even the Lakeridge 
court believed that “[h]aving—or being subject to—some degree of control is 
one of many indications that creditor may be a non-statutory insider.”262 
Control should be “probative of an insider relationship,” but under the current 
system and the improved definition, a finding of some level of control would 
not be dispositive of insider status.263 This has generally been only one of 
many factors a court will examine to bring a person into the non-statutory 
category.264  
The inquiry would still be enlightening under the proposed rule because the 
Code will retain the “person in control of debtor” definition of insider that 
applies to partnerships and corporations,265 but the “control” inquiry would not 
be necessary for other entities because the existence of a personal or financial 
relationship would suffice to trigger the arm’s length transaction inquiry. 
Furthermore, because many courts find the level of control to be probative266 
 
 259 In re Locke Mill Partners, 178 B.R. at 701. 
 260 Butler, 72 F.3d at 443 (quoting Hunter v. Babcock (In re Babcock Dairy Co.), 70 Bankr. 662, 666 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986)). 
 261 In re Three Flint Hill Ltd. P’shp., 213 B.R. at 299. 
 262 In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d at 1001. 
 263 In re Three Flint Hill Ltd. P’shp., 213 B.R. at 299. 
 264 In re Locke Mill Partners, 178 B.R. at 701. 
 265 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(31)(b)(iii), (c)(v) (2012) (a person in control of debtor is included as a specific 
enumerated definition of insider under both partnerships and corporations under the current definition). 
 266 In re Three Flint Hill Ltd. P’shp., 213 B.R. at 299. 
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of the relationship of the parties, this analysis would similarly apply under the 
proposed relationship prong. Finally, because the insider status is initially a 
rebuttable presumption, the purported insider may present evidence that 
concedes control, but still shows that the transaction was negotiated “as if the 
parties were strangers” and that no conflict of interest arose from the 
transaction.267 
A second argument against the definition change is that a court will have 
less discretion to conduct a fact-intensive inquiry due to the strict statutory 
criteria in the Code. The Ninth Circuit noted in Lakeridge that courts “must 
conduct a fact-intensive analysis to determine if a creditor and debtor share a 
close relationship and negotiated at arm’s length.”268 The court also mused that 
creating statutory insider status as a matter of law could prevent a proper 
factual analysis on a case-by-case basis.269 Under the proposed system, a court 
will have the same factual debate over whether to include these would-be 
insiders into the statutory definition, as they would non-statutory insiders. 
There will still be a fact-based examination of the parties’ relationship and the 
nature of the transaction with enough discretion left to the court to conclude at 
either of these steps that an insider determination is unwarranted. Ultimately, 
there will always be a factual debate over insider statuses, but this proposed 
Code change will more clearly settle the legal debate by providing a uniform 
analytical tool that will exclude a greater number of creditors if they meet the 
insider catchall test.  
Another counterargument is that the test will unduly harm debtors who are 
legitimately trying to reorganize by limiting the pool of non-insiders. In 
Lakeridge, the court worried that “a third-party assignee could be foreclosed 
from voting a claim acquired from an insider, even if the entire transaction was 
conducted at arm’s length.”270 This concern could stem from the fact that the 
proposed definition has a relatively broad scope initially. This concern is 
unjustified, however, because as the court stated in In re Friedman that, “not 
every creditor-debtor relationship attended by a degree of personal interaction 
between the parties rises to the level of an insider relationship.”271 Under the 
new definition the courts will retain the same discretion to determine what 
relationships are worthy of an insider determination. Furthermore, even if a 
 
 267 In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d at 1003–04 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)). 
 268 Id. at 1001. 
 269 Id. at 1000. 
 270 Id. 
 271 In re Friedman, 126 B.R. at 70. 
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court finds a close creditor-debtor relationship, if the parties negotiated the 
transaction at arm’s length, then the insider analysis will end at this step. 
The concern of harming legitimate debtors will be minimal under the new 
framework. This Comment’s proposed definitional change should only affect a 
relatively small set of creditors because the change is designed to affect 
chapter 11 insiders who have a pre-existing personal or financial relationship 
and conduct a less than arm’s length transaction. Without both elements of (1) 
a pre-existing close relationship and (2) a subsequent transfer, there is no 
trigger of this definitional provision. And even if the insider definition fits 
initially, the would-be insider may rebut the presumption by presenting any 
evidence it has that the deal was legitimate. The Lakeridge court’s anxiety, that 
a party could statutorily become an insider without a less than arm’s length 
claim sale, would be negated under the proposed definition.272 Any debtor 
trying to legitimately reorganize can sell the claim to another unrelated entity, 
sell the claim for full and fair consideration, or maintain the sale to the insider 
and exclude that insider’s vote under the cramdown rules.273 
The definitional change is designed to catch insiders such as Rabkin in 
Lakeridge, who purchased claims under questionable circumstances after his 
long standing relationship with a Bartlett had been established.274 This 
modification will leave out the common unsecured creditor who still associates 
with a debtor, including accountants, lawyers, and other professionals who 
have not engaged in such transactions.275 The definitional change would not 
cast a net so large that it deems any person with a preexisting relationship to be 
an insider. Much like in In re Blaine Richards & Co., where an accountant of a 
debtor was not considered to be an insider, the relationship itself does not 
establish insider status, but rather triggers a closer look when there is a 
subsequent transaction.276  
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this Comment argues for a change in how the Code defines 
an “insider” in § 101(31).277 This Comment proposes that the Code be 
modified from its current inclusive definition to one that is exclusive. The new 
 
 272 In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d at 1000. 
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 277 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2012). 
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definition should conclude with a final catchall provision that is designed to 
reach and examine a broad spectrum of insiders. This catchall should read as 
follows: “insider means . . . any person with close personal or financial 
relationships with the debtor that, as a result of a less than arm’s length 
transaction, becomes beholden to the debtor, raises a presumption that the 
person is an insider.”  
The modified Code provision will settle the disagreement among courts 
between broad and narrow definitions of non-statutory insiders by bringing 
many non-statutory insiders into the statutory frame. Currently the state of 
insider law is confusing, non-uniform, and subject to significant abuse. Some 
courts apply a narrow construction of the current definition, thus allowing 
persons who intuitively should be insiders to vote to approve plans that force 
unwanted cramdown restructuring plans on unwilling creditors.278 Other courts 
however, apply a broad interpretation to insiders, thus bringing more 
individuals into the statutory scope and limiting the voting power of these 
insiders for plan approval.279  
This broad interpretation is more appropriate to properly meet Congress’s 
intent and bankruptcy’s greater goals. Many courts have recognized the 
importance of the Code’s goal of equitable distribution, which in large part 
requires that similarly situated creditors receive fair treatment and that debtors 
are prevented from “giving preferred treatment to some creditors in derogation 
of the interests other[s].”280 The proposed definition includes a relatively broad 
insider definition to meet these goals, while also maintaining safeguards, such 
as the required two part analysis and rebuttable presumption, to prevent 
unnecessary insider determinations.  
The new definition will provide the courts with a uniform statutory 
framework for analyzing chapter 11 claim transfers that will provide 
bankruptcy judges and businesses with better guidance when considering 
potential insider transfers such as the one in Lakeridge.281 Also, the new 
provision will prevent economically unjustified transfers of claims to any 
parties that have a pre-existing close relationship with a debtor. Congress has 
made clear its intention to prevent closely related parties from making deals 
 
 278 In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d 993. 
 279 See In re Three Flint Hill Ltd. P’ship, 213 B.R. 292. 
 280 In re Kunz, 489 F.3d at 1075. 
 281 See In re Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 813 F.3d 993. This definition of “insider” would have prevented 
MBP from selling their insider claim to Rabkin with a guaranteed approval vote on the reorganization plan. At 
the very least, this new definition would have forced MBP’s board to negotiate a fair price for the claim and 
prevented the sale of a $2.76 million claim for only $5,000.  
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that undercut legitimate creditors in chapter 11 cases, just because a debtor’s 
insider does not clearly fall within the current statutory frame should not allow 
these persons to force restructuring plans on unwilling creditors.282  
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